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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the law of the sea has been conditioned by
conflicts over access to and control over the ocean's resources.
Many believed that when the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted in 1982, a fifty-year battle between
coastal State interests and those of maritime powers would be
satisfactorily resolved. This prediction has, alas, not been fulfilled,
as witnessed by renewed claims to resources located beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.
One such skirmish has emerged over the exploitation and
recovery of objects from historic shipwrecks and other submerged
sites, what has come to be called the "underwater cultural
heritage." Those wanting to change the law of historic salvage
have most clearly staked their positions. The nautical archaeology
community has spoken eloquently of the need to protect historically
significant shipwrecks from benign neglect by coastal States; from
looting by negligent sports divers; and from, worst of all,
unscrupulous and avaricious treasure hunters. A number of
coastal States have recently gone on record as declaring title to
shipwrecks located within two hundred miles of their shores or, in
the alternative, assertions of regulatory authority over that
underwater cultural heritage. Coastal States have thus discovered
that there lies within their grasp a resource that international law
has yet to allocate to governmental control: the historic salvage
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industry. Taking advantage of a vacuum, coastal States have
rushed in with their claims.
To date, however, no one from the private historic salvage
sector in maritime commerce has yet spoken against the proposals
of these coastal States. This is quite surprising since it appears
that some coastal State authorities and many nautical
archaeologists have expressed a desire to end the historical practice
of salvaging property lost at sea and returning it to the stream of
commerce. Many of the proposals that have been tendered to
create a new international legal regime for underwater cultural
heritage would all but abolish the private, commercial recovery of
historic shipwrecks. They would also divest the claims of record
owners of property more recently lost at sea, in essence
expropriating that property in the service of historic preservation.
This Essay critiques these recent proposals and demonstrates
that the traditional maritime law of salvage offers an instructive,
private-law alternative to proposed regimes to regulate underwater
cultural heritage through assertions of coastal State jurisdiction
and the elimination of private enterprise. The traditional maritime
law of salvage has evolved and has come to embrace and balance
commercial incentives as well as historic preservation values.
This Essay will explore the connection between an emerging
law of the sea for the underwater cultural heritage and the United
States' law of shipwreck salvage. Part II of the Essay provides an
overview of the U.S. historic salvage industry and charts the
intersection of what many regard as two very different and distinct
subjects: the international law of the sea (which regulates the use
and governance of ocean spaces as between States) and admiralty
law (the general maritime law which directs the private rights and
interests of seafarers and of maritime commerce). Part III
discusses Article 303 of the 1982 UNCLOS, which articulates
coastal States' jurisdiction over historic salvage. Part IV critiques
subsequent initiatives challenging Article 303 of UNCLOS, giving
special attention to the International Law Association's Draft
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.
Finally, Part V advocates a balanced approach to regulating the
salvage of historic shipwrecks.
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II. THE U.S. HISTORIC SALVAGE INDUSTRY
Historic salvage, also known as "treasure salvage," has become
a multi-billion dollar activity for U.S. maritime interests, defying
the overall trend diminishing the importance of the United States
in the maritime sector.1 Historic salvage, as the name suggests, is
dedicated to the recovery and preservation of artifacts and valuable
goods sunken on shipwrecks. It is an industry that combines
sophisticated technology and concern for historic preservation
values, all with an aim of returning long lost objects to public
appreciation and to the stream of commerce. Historic salvage
interests are often allied with those of the sport diving community,
which adds tourism revenue and aesthetic values to many coastal
regions around the United States and abroad.
Modern technology has made possible the recovery of long lost
and forgotten historic shipwrecks.2 The invention of SCUBA by
Jacques Yves Cousteau in 1942 was the first development. Then
followed the design of sophisticated side-scan sonar and other
search techniques which make possible the location of finds and
deposits on the ocean floor. Mixed-gas diving has permitted
adventurous human beings to reach ocean depths that had
previously been unimaginable. Finally, the use of submersibles
and remote-robotic technologies has allowed recovery from wrecks
at the very bottom of the ocean abyss. As one can imagine, diving
technology has not come cheap. Vast investments of money, as
well as the time, toil, and sacrifice of divers, have made it possible.
In all of this, U.S. historic salvage firms have led the way.
Sparked by the epic efforts of Arthur McKee and Mel Fisher in
locating Spanish galleons off the Florida coast during the 1950s
and 1960s, American treasure salvors have been active in diving
operations in all of the world's oceans. U.S. historic salvors have
acquired the reputation of being the most technologically advanced,
the most daring, and also the most concerned with preserving
historical values of the items they recover. Most treasure salvors
1. See David Arnold, Treasure Hunting Becoming a Growth Industry, BOSTO0N GLOBE,
Oct. 21, 1991, Health-Science Sec. at p. 27.
2. For more on this, see Feasibility Study for the Drafting of a New Instrument for the
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO Doc. 146 EX127, at 1-2, 1I 7-10
(Mar. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Feasibility Study]; William J. Broad, Deepest Wrecks Now Visible
to Cameras, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1993, at Cl.
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recognize that certain objects they recover are not only priceless in
a monetary sense, but also in an intangible way as part of national
(or international) cultural patrimonies. Such items are routinely
donated to museums or traveling cultural exhibitions.
A. Traditional U.S. Law of Shipwreck Salvage
Traditional rules of maritime law-observed by all seafaring
nations in the world-provided the necessary legal security for
those prepared to invest time and money in finding lost
shipwrecks.3 The admiralty laws of salvage and finds grant to
those who locate and save property lost at sea, either (1) a claim to
a reward from the owner of the lost property, or (2) if the property
is abandoned and has no owner, outright title to the find. The
power to grant these incentives has, under the traditional
maritime law, been left to the judges of courts exercising admiralty
or maritime law jurisdiction. In the United States, these are the
federal courts.
Salvage is a core subject of admiralty jurisdiction, which has
always been the exclusive preserve of the federal courts. The law
of salvage is of ancient vintage.4 Under the law of salvage,
compensation [is] allowed to persons by whose voluntary
assistance a ship at sea or her cargo or both have been saved
in whole or in part from impending sea peril, or in recovering
such property from actual peril or loss, as in cases of ship
wreck, derelict or recapture.
The original owner of the imperiled vessel retains title thereto,
but the salvor is entitled to a very liberal salvage award from the
res of the vessel.6 The courts have recognized that liberal salvage
awards further the fundamental public policy of encouraging
3. For the application of the admiralty law doctrines of salvage and finds to historic
shipwrecks, see Anne M. Cottrell, The Law of the Sea and International Marine Archaeology:
Abandoning Admiralty Law to Protect Historic Shipwrecks, 17 FORDHAM INVL L.J. 667
(1994); Douglas S. Cohen, Should Noli Fodendi Apply to Sunken Ships?, 73 B.U. L. REV. 193
(1993).
4. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 532-33 (2d ed.,
1975).
5. The SABINE, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1880). See also Columbus-America Discovery
Group v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
1000 (1993) [hereinafter CADGI.
6. See CADG, 974 F.2d at 459.
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salvage and recovery efforts and reward those who engage in
laborious, costly, and potentially dangerous undertakings.7
By operation of law, the salvor has a maritime lien against the
res of the recovered vessel and its cargo.' The salvor enforces the
lien by bringing an in rem action in federal court against the vessel
and its cargo.9 As explained by Chief Justice Taney in the case of
Houseman v. The Cargo of The SCHOONER NORTH
CAROLINA,"0 in rem salvage actions against vessels fall squarely
within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts
conferred under Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution:
Now, the matter in dispute, is merely a question of salvage....
Upon such questions, there can be no doubt of the jurisdiction
of a court of admiralty; nor of its authority to proceed in rem,
and attach the property detained. The admiralty is the only
court where such a question can be tried; for what other court,
but a court of admiralty, has jurisdiction to try a question of
salvage? 1
B. Modern U.S. Law of Shipwreck Salvage
Despite its historic origins, the law of salvage has readily
evolved to meet modern concerns regarding historic preservation of
shipwrecks. Because the salvor essentially acts as an agent of the
district court in recovering the wreck and bringing it into the
jurisdiction of the court, judges have broad discretion both in the
initial selection and appointment of the salvor, and later, in
deciding the amount of the salvor's award. The federal courts have
exercised that discretion to ensure that the historical values of
antiquated shipwrecks are preserved in the salvage process.
7. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 4, at 532 (citing numerous cases).
8. See id. at 628.
9. See FED. R. Civ. P., Supp. Adm. R. C (1)(a).
10. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 40 (1841).
11. Id. at 48. See also Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556 (1954);
Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam
Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1063-64 (1st Cir. 1987) (in rem action for salvage award against
artifacts recovered from antiquated shipwreck is governed by general federal maritime law
and is within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction); Cobb Coin Company, Inc. v.
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 549 F.Supp. 540, 548 (S.D. Fla. 1982)
(same). See also The MOSES TAYLOR, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866) (state courts may not
provide in rem remedies); The HINE v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1866) (same).
[Vol. 30:1
HISTORIC SALVAGE
It has been suggested that ancient and modern salvage laws
have developed over centuries without any regard for archaeology.
The underlying policy thrust of the assertion is that the hoary
admiralty law of salvage is totally unsuited to the "modern"
problem of managing historic shipwrecks as a cultural resource.
The policy alternative advocated by many historic preservationists
is that salvage law be replaced by further governmental regulation
of shipwrecks, regulation that will uniquely privilege decision-
making by nautical archaeologists. The clear message is that
shipwrecks should, under no circumstances, be considered an
economic resource, as lost property to be restored to the "stream of
commerce."
Indeed, it has been suggested that wreck salvage has never
been part of admiralty jurisdiction. This is utterly fallacious. All
salvage of property lost at sea implicates maritime commerce, a
central concern of admiralty law.12 And the power to regulate such
activities was specifically reserved by Congress in the Submerged
Lands Act.1" Courts have consistently held that salvage of wrecked
vessels is within the scope of traditional admiralty jurisdiction. 4
Wrecked vessels are still subject to marine peril, under the
traditional rule of The SABINE."
It might be helpful to the debate to realize that the admiralty
law of salvage is not as rigid or as single-focused as has been
supposed. At least as applied in admiralty courts in the United
States, historic preservation values have been merged with
"traditional" salvage law. It has become the consistent practice of
U.S. courts that the granting or denial of exclusive salvage rights
over an historic shipwreck to a commercial recovery outfit is at
least partially contingent on salvors' observing archaeological
protocols that protect evidence for future study and research about
the wreck and its contents. For example, in the MDM Salvage
case, the District Court denied the applications of two different
12. See Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. 1 (1871); DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
13. See 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1988) (expressly retained for the United States "all
its...powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters for the
constitutional purposes of commerce [and] navigation....").
14. North Pacific S.S. Co. v. Hall Bros. Co., 249 U.S. 119 (1919); The George W. Elder,
206 F. 268 (9th Cir. 1913).
15. 101 U.S. 384 (1880). See also Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked &
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1978); Cobb Coin, 549 F. Supp. at 557.
16. 631 F. Supp. 308, 310-11 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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sets of commercial salvors to recover property from a Spanish
galleon, noting that neither firm had attempted to preserve the
"archaeological integrity" of the wreck. The Court noted that:
Archaeological preservation, onsite photography, and the
marking of sites are particularly important.. .as the public
interest is compelling in circumstances in which a treasure
ship, constituting a window in time[,] provides a unique
opportunity to create a historical record of an earlier era.
These factors constitute a significant element of entitlement to
be considered when exclusive salvage rights are sought.
17
Thus, U.S. courts have made express that the potential
salvors fidelity to archaeological values is among the elements to
be considered in granting a salvage award. 8 This is not to say, of
course, that commercial salvors have been held to exactly the same
technical standards as adopted by nautical archaeologists. Under
special circumstances, U.S. courts have allowed for some modest
deviations from these protocols. 9
III. THE 1982 U.N. LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
Prior to the 1980s, no coastal nation purported to exercise
regulatory jurisdiction over historic shipwrecks, except for those
located within its "territorial sea," originally set at three nautical
miles and later expanded to twelve.2" Even with the development
of the regime of the continental shelf, historic shipwrecks were
explicitly not included-only "natural" resources (such as oil, gas,
17. Id. at 310.
18. See CADG, 974 F.2d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993);
Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. The BROTHER JONATHAN, 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1362 (N.D. Cal.
1995), aft'd, 102 F.3d 379 (9th Cir. 1996), afl'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 118
S.Ct. 1484 (1998).
19. See Moyer v. The ANDREA DORIA, 836 F. Supp. 1099, 1107 (D.N.J. 1993) (where
the Court noted that because the ocean liner was of "decidedly modern vintage, [tihere exist
extensive photographs, deck plans, models, and other documentation"); Platoro Limited, Inc.
v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 518 F. Supp. 816, 822 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
20. But see Treaty Between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea
Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Two Countries,
including the Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, Dec. 18, 1978, Austi-Papua
New Guinea, art. 9, 18 I.L.M. 291, 298 (apparently claiming general jurisdiction over
shipwrecks located on mutual continental shelves). Australian legislation appeared to make
this claim, as well. See Historic Shipwrecks Act, 1976, ch. 190 (Austl.). See also Agreement
on Old Dutch Shipwrecks, Austl.-Neth., 1972 Austl. T.S. No. 18.
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or shellfish) were included.2 U.S. law reflects this rule.2 Under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act," the United States takes
title only to natural resources of the seabed or subsoil. Jurisdiction
over shipwrecks remains in the hands of the admiralty courts,
applying the traditional maritime law of salvage or finds.
UNCLOS was negotiated between 1973 and 1982. Questions
of coastal State jurisdiction over historic shipwrecks were never
problematic,24 being raised for the first time only in the 1980
session of the negotiations. It was quickly agreed that the absolute
limit of coastal State authority over "archaeological and historical
objects found at sea" was twenty-four nautical miles, the outer
limit of the contiguous zone, established under Article 33 of the
Convention. Article 303, paragraph 2, codifies this understanding:
In order to control traffic in such objects [archaeological and
historic objects found at sea], the coastal State may, in
applying article 33 [on Contiguous Zones], presume that their
removal from the sea-bed in the zone referred to in that article
without its approval would result in an infringement [of its
laws] .25
The United States, despite the demands of a group of
Mediterranean countries (which wanted a 200-mile zone for
regulatory control over shipwrecks), insisted that twenty-four miles
should be the outward limit of such jurisdiction. Happily, the
United States' position prevailed. Moreover, Article 303,
21. See Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, para. 1, 499 U.N.T.S.
312 ("The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.") (emphasis added). "Natural resources" are
defined as "the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with
living organisms belonging to sedentary species...." Id. art. 2, para. 4. In the deliberations
of the International Law Commission, leading up to the drafting of the 1958 Convention,
coastal State jurisdiction over shipwrecks located on continental shelves was explicitly
considered and rejected. See U.N. GAOB, 11th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 42, U.N. Doec. A/3159
(1956) ("It is clearly understood that the rights in question do not cover objects such as
wrecked ships and their cargoes (including bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the sand
of the subsoil."). See also Anthony Clark Arend, Archaeological and Historical Objects: The
International Implications of UNCLOS 111, 22 VA. J. INr L. 777, 784-86 (1982).
22. See Treasure Salvors v. Unidentified Wreck, 569 F.2d 330, 337-40 (5th Cir. 1978).
23. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq. (1988).
24. Beyond the scope of this Article is a consideration of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention's provisions allowing coastal State regulation of marine scientific research in
various maritime zones. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, part XUI,
U.N. Doec. AICONF.62122 (1982), 21 I.L.MI 1261, 1316-20 [hereinafter UNCLOSI.
25. Id. art. 303, para. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1326.
19981
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
paragraph 3, explicitly reserved the rights of salvage or finds under
traditional maritime law:26 "Nothing in this article affects the
rights of identifiable owners, the law of salvage or other rules of
admiralty ("r~gles du droit maritime" in French), or laws or
practices with respect to cultural exchanges."27 Article 303 was a
full and complete vindication of the United States' negotiating
strategy at UNCLOS III to limit inappropriate claims of coastal
State jurisdiction, especially where such claims interfere with
vested rights or free enterprise exploitation of ocean resources.2"
IV. RECENT INITIATIVES TO REVISE ARTICLE 303
Article 303 of the 1982 UNCLOS was intended to be the
definitive word on coastal State jurisdiction over shipwrecks. But
no sooner had the ink dried on the treaty, than initiatives began to
promote further, creeping jurisdiction over underwater cultural
heritage located beyond twenty-four nautical miles from shore.
A. 1984 Council of Europe Draft Convention
The first such move was the Council of Europe's 1984 Draft
Convention on the Underwater Cultural Heritage (Council of
Europe Draft).29 This instrument acknowledged the twenty-four-
nautical mile limit on coastal State jurisdiction reflected in Article
303 of TrNCLOSY It nevertheless purported to suggest that
26. For a complete description of the negotiating history of Article 303, consult 5
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY 158-62 (Myron
H. Nordquist ed. 1989).
27. UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 303, para. 3, 21 I.L.M. at 1326.
28. See Bruce E. Alexander, Treasure Salvage Beyond the Territorial Sea: An
Assessment and Recommendations, 20 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1989); Arend, supra note 21 at
787-91, 793-99; Jean-Pierre Beurier, Pour un droit international de l'archeologie sous-marine,
93 REVUE GNERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 45 (1989); Lucius Caflisch, Submarine
Antiquities and the International Law of the Sea, 13 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INTL L. 3 (1982);
John P. Fry, The Treasure Below: Jurisdiction over Salving Operations in International
Waters, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (1988).
29. Draft Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, DIR/JUR
(84) 1 (1984) [hereinafter Council of Europe Drafti]; Final Activity Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee of Experts on the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Doc. No. CAHAQ (85) 5 (1985)
(on file with author); Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation No. 848,
30th Sess., 2d part (Oct. 4, 1978). This instrument was modeled on a Report prepared by
Lyndell V. Prott & P.J. O'Keefe, Final Report on Legal Protection of Underwater Cultural
Heritage, Appendix II to Council of Europe, in THE UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE 45
(1978).
30. See Council of Europe Draft, supra note 29, art. 2, para. 2.
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coastal States could exercise such power on their respective
continental shelves,"1 a result that had been explicitly rejected in
Article 303 and the earlier 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf.32 Rather mysteriously, the Council of Europe Draft allowed a
"[ciontracting State to apply, in conformity with international law,
its laws and regulations relating to the protection of underwater
cultural property within an area beyond its territorial sea,"3 thus
seemingly encouraging the expansion of coastal State authority.
Moreover, the Council of Europe Draft called upon a party to
"require its nationals to report to its competent authorities any
discovery of underwater cultural property outside the jurisdiction
of any State."4
The Council of Europe Draft also evidenced some ambivalence
towards commercial salvage of historic shipwrecks. While the
Draft allowed Contracting States to grant "authorisations to carry
out survey, excavation or recovery operations.. .to private
persons,"31 such "authorisations may be granted only on the basis of
scientific considerations... .3 What such considerations might be
is not elaborated in the Draft, but the clear implication is that
commercial recovery of artifacts from historic shipwrecks may
never be justified by "scientific considerations." Finally, the Council
of Europe Draft called upon Contracting Parties to take steps to
identify underwater cultural property that had been illegally
recovered in, or illegally exported from, a coastal State's area of
jurisdiction (including its territorial sea, contiguous zone or
beyond),37 to restore it to the proper State,"9 and to facilitate
recovery for damages to that cultural property."
Despite some promising aspects of the Council of Europe
Draft, objections to its increased scope of coastal State jurisdiction
31. Id. art. 2, para. 5 ("Each Contracting State, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over the
exploration for and exploitation of the natural resources of its continental shelf, shall take
appropriate measures for the protection of underwater cultural property .....
32. See supra text accompanying note 21.
33. Council of Europe Draft, supra note 29, art. 2, para. 6.
34. Id. art. 15.
35. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
36. Id. art. 5, para. 2.
37. See id. art. 12.
38. See id. art. 13.
39. See id. art 14.
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doomed it to failure." No final version of that instrument was ever
opened for signature.
B. 1989 Salvage Convention
In 1989, the International Maritime Organization, a
specialized agency of the United Nations charged with the
regulation of shipping, concluded an International Convention on
Salvage.4  The 1989 Salvage Convention replaced the 1910
Brussels Convention on Salvage, which did not contain any
provisions on historic shipwrecks. It has been argued that the
1989 Salvage Convention impliedly excluded historic shipwrecks
from its application. 2 The Convention defines "salvage operations"
as "any act or activity to assist a vessel or any other property in
danger in navigable waters or in any waters whatsoever." A The
argument would run that because shipwrecks are not "in danger,"
they would not qualify for salvage. But, as already mentioned,"
shipwrecks are often characterized as being in marine peril under
the general maritime law, and thus do qualify for salvage.4 So this
purported exclusion of shipwreck salvage from the 1989 Salvage
Convention appears doubtful or, at best, ineffective."
More pertinently, the 1989 Salvage Convention allows a State,
upon ratification, to make a reservation "not to apply the
provisions of th[e] Convention.. .when the property involved is
maritime cultural property of prehistoric, archeological or historic
interest and is situated on the sea-bed."7 This obviously means
40. See Patrick J. O'Keefe & James A-R. Naffiger, Report: The Draft Convention on the
Underwater Cultural Heritage, 25 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 391, 397 (1994).
41. International Convention on Salvage, IMO Doc. LEGCONF.7/27 (May 2, 1989),
[hereinafter 1989 Salvage Convention]. For more background on the 1989 Convention, see
Geoffrey Brice, Salvage and the Marine Environment, 70 TUL. L. REV. 669 (1995); Nicholas
J.J. Gaskell, The International Salvage Convention of 1989, 4 INVL J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL
L. 268 (1989); Brian F. Binney, Protecting the Environment with Salvage Law: Risks,
Rewards, and the 1989 Salvage Convention, 65 WASH. L. REV. 639 (1990).
42. See O'Keefe & Nafriger, supra note 40, at 393.
43. 1989 Salvage Convention, supra note 41, art. 1, para. 1.
44. See supra text accompanying note 15.
45. This matter was discussed extensively in the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) Legal Committee deliberation on the 1989 Salvage Convention. See IMO Does.
LEG/564(5; LEG 56/WP. 14.
46. See also Feasibility Study, supra note 2, at 3, 19 (incorrectly suggesting that
French and Spanish efforts to exclude historic shipwrecks from salvage under 1989
Convention were "accepted").
47. 1989 Salvage Convention, supra note 41, art. 30, para. 1(d).
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that the 1989 Convention would, in the absence of a Contracting
State making a reservation, apply to salvage of historic shipwrecks.
Upon its ratification, the United States declined to reserve against
the Convention's application to historic shipwrecks. As of 1996,
only eight States had made the necessary reservation regarding
the non-applicability of the Convention to historic salvage.48 The
Convention entered force of July 14, 1996, and as of January 1998
has twenty-five parties representing over a quarter of the world's
ocean-going shipping tonnage.49
As of this writing, it is uncertain whether the 1989 Salvage
Convention will have any impact on the recovery of artifacts from
historic shipwrecks. Arguably the 1989 Convention has no bearing
on the question of coastal State authority to regulate shipwreck
recovery, that matter having been presumably settled in the 1982
UNCLOS. Nevertheless, the provisions of the 1989 Salvage
Convention lend credence to the principle that historic salvage is
not to be presumptively excluded from the ambit of salvage
operations and that the general maritime law of salvage continues
to extend to recovery of historic wrecks."
C. Unilateral Assertions of Coastal State Control
over Shipwrecks
Despite the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention's bar on coastal
States' claiming title to or asserting regulatory authority over
historic shipwrecks located beyond a State's contiguous zone
(twenty-four nautical miles from shore), a handful of countries
have done just that. As already noted,5 Australia was probably the
first to do so in section 28 of its 1976 Historic Shipwrecks Act,
although the provision is qualified by reference to international
48. See STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRuMENTS IN RESPECT OF
WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS SECRETARY GENERAL PERFORMS
DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS 458 (Dec. 31, 1993) (reservations of Mexico, Saudi Arabia,
and Spain); See also Report of the Meeting of Experts for the Protection of Underwater
Cultural Heritage, UNESCO Doc. CLT-96/CONF.605/6, at 12, 91 48 (May 22-24, 1996)
[hereinafter Report of the Meeting of Experts].
49. See IMO, Summary of Status of Conventions as of Jan. 5, 1998, <http/www.imo.
org'convent/summary.htm> (visited Feb. 10, 1998).
50. But see Report of the Meeting of Experts, supra note 48, at 12, 91 48 (where an expert
from the IMO, Mr. Augustin Blanco-Bazn, opined that "because of the private-law, non-
mandatory character of the Convention, the right to exclude the application of salvage law
existed even without express reservation.").
51. See supra note 20.
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law. So, at least one commentator has suggested that Australia's
claim to shipwrecks located on its continental shelf may, on its own
terms, be ineffective."
Other countries-including China, Cyprus, Ireland, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, and the former Yugoslavia-have made claims to
shipwrecks situated on their respective continental shelves.53 Yet
other nations have linked their claim to historic shipwrecks to the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime. These include Cape
Verde, Denmark, Jamaica, Morocco, and Romania,54 although quite
a number of States have asserted sovereign rights over "all
resources" of the EEZ, and not just the "natural resources" of the
Zone as permitted by Article 56(1) of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention. None of these claims appears to be qualified by
reference to international law.
Nevertheless, some writers have concluded that "Itihe limited
number of States.. .which have expanded their jurisdiction over
underwater cultural property on the continental shelf, cannot
provide the basis for the creation of a customary rule.... The
same would seem to apply to cultural property found in the EEZ.""
Other scholars appear to disagree. As has been aptly described,
the situation for cultural property located beyond the territorial sea
is in "confusion."58
D. The International Law Association Draft
Convention
The last major challenge to the 1982 UNCLOS's settlement of
coastal States' rights to historic shipwrecks was the fashioning of a
Draft Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage by the International Law Association (ILA Draft).59 The
52. ANASTASIA STRATI, THE PROTECTION OF THE UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE:
AN EMERGING OBJECTIVE OF THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA 259 (1995).
53. See id. 289-90 n.95. See also Feasibility Study, supra note 2, at 4, 23.
54. See STRATI, supra note 52, at 292 n.100.
55. For a list of these nations, see id. at 292 n.101 (including North Korea, Mauritius,
Pakistan, Seychelles, Vanuatu, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Philippines, and Tanzania).
56. Id. at 269.
57. Seee.g., Janet Blake, The Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage, 45 INTL &
COMP. L. Q. 819 (1996). See also Feasibility Study, supra note 2, at 5, 24 (suggesting that
coastal States have recognized customary international law extending jurisdiction over
shipwrecks beyond contiguous zone).
58. See O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 394.
59. For the purposes of the discussion here, I refer to the version of the ILA Draft
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ILA is an international organization of academic international law
specialists, acting in their individual capacities. The ILA Draft
was under consideration for a few years, but no input was invited
from any person or entity other than those concerned with historic
preservation values. The final product of the ILA's work was
adopted at Buenos Aires in 1994.
While a treaty of the sort proposed by the ILA certainly
benefits the public by promoting the educational, cultural, and
recreational value represented by underwater cultural heritage,
this particular draft is problematic at best. At worst, it damages
the very interests it purports to serve. The ILA Draft would have
sounded the death knell for the international community of sports
and treasure divers, and consequently, whatever gains it would
have achieved would only have been pyrrhic. The ILA Draft, as
written, strikes a Faustian bargain in which the delineated
protections of the underwater cultural heritage would eventually
herald that very heritage's doom. The ILA Draft features
definitional ambiguities, novel maritime zones that violate (or
dramatically alter) pre-existing international treaty regimes, and
anarchical retroactive enforcement. All of these problems will
certainly vitiate any positive steps made by the ILA Draft.
In fact, the ILA Draft threatens to put an end to all but the
most disreputable operations for the salvage and recovery of
shipwrecks (among other underwater artifacts). The increased
expense for such excavation will drastically lower profitability
margins, and the inapplicability of salvage law will nearly
eliminate any commercial interest in such activity. Not
surprisingly, the ILA Draft was unacceptable to the international
diving and historic salvage communities, and, paradoxically, it
should be opposed for the very reasons that the treaty enlists in
support of its goals.
1. Definitional Problems
The definitions set out in Article 1 of the ILA Draft are over-
inclusive and ambiguous. As such, they are prone to
misinterpretation or confusion, as the following examples will
show.
Convention appearing in O eefe & Nafziger, supra note 40 [hereinafter ILA Draft].
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a. Underwater Cultural Heritage
The term "underwater cultural heritage" itself is problematic.
It is so broadly inclusive that it stretches to "all underwater traces
of human existence."' Does this mean that pieces of a splintered
surfboard or even a soda can thrown overboard on a fishing outing
should be countenanced by the ILA Draft? Certainly not, but the
definition would seem to cover such items. The term, which is
defined to include "sites, structures, buildings,"6' could easily be
read also to include support beams of piers, lobster traps, and oil
rig platforms.
Article 1, paragraph 1, further confuses matters with the
definition of "wreck" in paragraph 1(b) as including "a vessel,
aircraft, or other vehicle or any part thereof, its cargo or other
contents,"' and the official commentary amplifies the inclusion of
the cargo and other contents of the wreck.63 Does this mean that
the ship's cargo is covered by the ILA Draft even if it has drifted off
or has washed ashore? The commentary to these definitions points
out that "Iclontext is one of the most essential aspects of
archaeological heritage in providing knowledge of life during a
particular era,'" but despite the inclusion of the archaeological and
natural contexts in the definition of "underwater cultural heritage,"
there is no definition of the scope of such contexts.
Furthermore, the definitions of "underwater cultural heritage"
are so expansive as to be outlandish. The commentary states that
"[t]his is likely to include all aspects of the underwater cultural
heritage of significance to the history of humanity." This over-
inclusive definition ignores the necessity for a requirement of
significance, whether cultural or historical. In order to create both
a manageable regime and one worthy of international treaty, only
wrecks of significance should be included in the definition.
These definitions, in tandem with the commentary provided by
the drafters, seem to falsely equate age with historical significance.
Under the ILA Draft, cargo could be considered "underwater
cultural heritage" because of its contents but then be denied
60. ILA Draft, art. 1, para. 1, reprinted in O eefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 405.
61. Id. art. 1, para. 1(a).
62. Id. art. 1, para. 1(b).
63. See O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 406 (cmt. 1).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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protection of this definition if that cargo lacks "historical
significance." For example, if a cargo ship loaded with simple raw
materials sank, its contents would be considered "underwater
cultural heritage." But, in this situation, the cargo has no
independent historical significance and thus would not be
considered "underwater cultural heritage." The glaring absence in
paragraph 1 of an additional provision which would remedy the
problem of the faulty assumption that age equals significance is a
tremendous failing of the ILA Draft. A provision to the effect that
the treaty shall apply to those articles that have historical
significance and substantively add to historical understanding
would be a start for focusing perhaps the most important definition
of the treaty."
Concomitant with the limited definition of "underwater
cultural heritage," the ILA Draft needs to adopt some sort of
tentative list (albeit a list that is not exclusive) that would identify
the types of historically significant items that would be granted the
protection of the ILA Draft. A listing approach, such as the
National Register system in the United States,67 might be a
suitable vehicle for such identification." This process would enable
each State Party to an international regime to create a list of
"significant" wrecks, thereby giving full information to divers. This
definition would also create a rebuttable presumption and allow for
continued exploration of shipwrecks and the recovery of property
lost at sea.
b. Abandonment
Article 1, paragraph 2, indicates that the ILA Draft only
applies to underwater cultural heritage that has been
"abandoned."69 The definition propounded in this paragraph,
however, is unacceptable due to confusing and unrealistic time
constraints. This definition allows a period of twenty-five years
66. This formulation would be consistent with the view taken by UNESCO on such
issues. See, e.g., Feasibility Study, supra note 2 at 1, 4; Report of the Meeting of Experts,
supra note 48, at 3-5, 1 10, 13, 14, 19.
67. As referenced in The Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2102(b), 2105 ((a)(3)
(1988); see also National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1988).
68. But see Feasibility Study, supra note 2 at 8, TI 42 (doubting whether the 1972
UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage could be
applied to shipwreck sites offshore or the artifacts recovered therefrom).
69. ILA Draft, art. 1, para. 2, reprinted in O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 405.
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from the discovery of technology sufficient to recover the heritage,
or if no technology was available to permit recovery, fifty years
from "the last assertion of interest by the owner" of the
"underwater cultural heritage" before the heritage is deemed
legally abandoned." This is too short a time span to assume that
the owner or interested party has abandoned all hope of ever
locating the item. The ILA Draft creates a new international
standard for abandonment that is quite inconsistent with the long-
standing general maritime law.
In Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual
Insurance Co.," the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a group of insurance companies which had assumed title
to the SS Central America (which sank in 1857 off the coast of
South Carolina) but had failed to recover the wreck within the
intervening 135 years was still the proper owner. Similarly
lengthy time frames were at issue in negotiations between
Australia and the Netherlands over the ownership of wrecks of
vessels that had belonged to the Dutch East India Company."
The general maritime law has, moreover, consistently held
that currently identifiable owners of property unwillingly lost at
sea are presumed not to have abandoned their rights and
interests."3 That is why the legal test for abandonment (whether
on land or at sea) has always required two elements: (1) an intent
to abandon; and (2) an act carrying that intent into effect."4 Indeed,
some courts have required "strong and convincing evidence" for
proof of abandonment."5 Presumptive periods for abandonment
70. See id.
71. 974 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993).
72. See supra text accompanying note 20; see also Robinson v. Western Australian
Museum, [1977] 16 A.L.R. 623, 647-48, 654, 663, 671-74 (Austl.) (holding that original owner
retained title); Simon v. Taylor, [19751 2 Lloyd's Rep. 338 (Sing. Ct. 1974) (same).
73. The AKABA, 54 F. 197, 200 (4th Cir. 1893); Wilkie v. 250 Boxes of Sugar, 29 F. Cas.
1247 (D.S.C. 1796) (No. 17,662).
74. See CADG, 974 F.2d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993);
Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965) (abandonment is an ultimate
fact or conclusion based upon a combination of act and intent); Morrissette v. United States,
187 F.2d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1951), rev'd on other grounds, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (same).
75. See CADG, 974 F.2d at 461-65; Zych v. The LADY ELGIN, 755 F. Supp. 213, 214-16
(N.D. Ill. 1990). I should not be seen as suggesting that wrecks of truly "ancient" vintage are
never deemed abandoned. The general maritime law's requirement of a currently identifiable
owner resolves this concern. Many courts have required an authentic chain-of-title from the
original hull or cargo owner to the current salvor-claimant. See Bemis v. The RMS
LUSITANIA, 884 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1995), affd, 99 F.3d 1129 (4th Cir. 1996).
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have thus been disfavored in the general maritime law.76
In passing U.S. legislation known as the Abandoned
Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA),7  Congress intended that courts
apply the general maritime law's presumption against
abandonment of property involuntarily lost at sea.78  Indeed, the
ASA does not directly define the term abandonment. However,
Congress desired that the Act apply to "certain abandoned
shipwrecks, which have been deserted and to which the owner has
relinquished ownership rights with no retention." 9 Congress' use
of the terms "deserted" and "relinquished" require, at a bare
minimum, a strongly evinced intent to abandon. These words may
even be regarded as terms-of-art, a congressional recognition that
the maritime law applies a strong presumption against
abandonment."0  Congress obviously had the opportunity to
establish a statutory presumption of abandonment and did not do
so.
In cases of involuntary loss at sea, the consistent standard
used by admiralty courts has been to ascertain whether the owner
had the knowledge and means to recover the property. If the
owner knew of the location of the wreck and had the technical
means to economically recover the wreck, but failed to do so, that
constitutes an abandonment. If not, then the wreck cannot be
deemed to be abandoned by inference.8' This is utterly consistent
with the intent of Congress as expressed in the ASA's legislative
history: "[T]he term abandoned does not require the original owner
to actively disclaim title or ownership. The abandonment or
relinquishment of ownership rights may be implied or otherwise
inferred, as by an owner never asserting any control over or
76. But see Abandoned Wreck Law (Revised), 1977, §§ 2, 3, 12 (Cayman Is.); Historic
Shipwrecks Act, 1976, § 4A (Austl.), both abstracted in 0'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at
395.
77. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (1988).
78. This result was confirmed in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in California v.
Deep Sea Research, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1464, 1473 (1998) (indicating that the definition of
.abandonment" in Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 should follow that in admiralty law).
79. 43 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (1988).
S0. See Nunley v. M/V DAUNTLESS COLOCOTRONIS, 863 F.2d 1190, 1198 (5th Cir.
1989) (valid abandonment occurs through act of "deserting" property); Katsaris v. United
States, 684 F.2d 758, 762 (11th Cir. 1982) (abandonment does not occur unless there is a
"total desertion" by the owner); Everhart v. State Life Ins. Co., 154 F.2d 347, 356 (6th Cir.
1946) (abandonment is an "absolute relinquishment or renunciation" of a right).
81. See CADG, 974 F.2d 450, 461 4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993); Zych
v. The LADY ELGIN, 755 F. Supp. 213, 217 (N.D. IMI. 1990).
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otherwise indicating his claim of possession of the shipwreck."2
Rather, following from the suggestive language in the ASA
legislative history, a court can infer abandonment, but only when
the owner has failed to "assert control" or "otherwise indicat[ed] [a]
claim of possession.83
While the ILA Draft claims to "stabilize expectations" and to
preserve the reasonable rights of owners," the fifty-year limit does
no such thing. The provisions regarding the availability of
technology suitable to recovery of cultural heritage are convoluted
and obtuse. It is unclear whether the two clauses" are
contradictory or merely alternatives. Clause 2(a) leaves open the
possibility of reading an indefinite time period into the ILA Draft
such as a twenty-five-year span following the discovery of
technology that would make recovery feasible. However, clause
2(b) allows only fifty years following an assertion of the owner's
rights if no technology suitable to the task was available.
The ambiguity resulting from these definitions leaves much to
be desired and will certainly cause the ILA Draft to falter. At a
minimum, these provisions appear to shift the burden from a
presumption of ownership to one of abandonment. Not only does
this conflict with the general maritime law, it will necessitate a
case-by-case analysis to determine whether an item was truly
abandoned by the rightful owner.
Ironically, the ILA Draft does assume that one class of
underwater cultural heritage is never abandoned: "any warship,
military aircraft, naval auxiliary or other vessels or aircraft owned
82. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-298, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102
Stat.) 365, 366.
83. According to well established precedent, a cargo insurer who declares a total loss
and pays the full policy limits takes title of the property via subrogation. This can be
accomplished through a formal tender of abandonment or by simply paying the full claims.
See Great Western Ins. Co. v. Fogarty, 86 U.S. 640 (1873); Patapso Ins. Co. v. Southgate, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 604, 622-23 (1831); CADG, 974 F.2d at 457 ("Under applicable law, then and
now, once the underwriters paid the claims made upon them by the owners of the gold, the
treasure became theirs."); The TASHMOO, 1937 A-M.C. 1536, 1539-1541 (Arb. 1937) ("an
underwriter who has fully reimbursed his insured in respect to a loss is entitled to any
salvage that results in respect to such loss.... ."). Insurers do not lightly declare total losses
and pay full policy limits. When they do so, they expect to take title and to acquire the
benefits of any subsequent salvage. Marine insurers have led in the recovery of valuable
property from shipwrecks, and its return to the stream of commerce, precisely because they
have invested in that property when they paid on the loss policies.
84. ILA Draft, reprinted in OlKeefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 406 cmt. 2.
85. See id. art. 1, 2(a) & (b) reprinted in O Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 405.
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or operated by a State...." According to the ILA Commentary,
"[t]he mere passage of time should not be interpreted to establish
abandonment of such material."7 Although this is not the place to
consider whether sovereign vessels or aircraft lost at sea can be
abandoned,88 it is interesting to note that the ILA Draft resolves
this issue in favor of States, thus removing a possible ground for
objection to the Draft. 8
2. Scope of "Underwater Cultural Heritage"
Regarding the general scope of the ILA Draft, Article 2
provides that it only applies to "underwater cultural heritage" that
has been abandoned and has also been submerged for at least 100
years (with the caveat that "[any State Party may, however,
protect underwater cultural heritage which has been submerged
underwater for less than 100 years")."0 This article creates some
interesting problems.
First, it creates an unusual effect on the laws of finds and
salvage. Article 2 creates at least a fifty-year window in which a
wreck is deemed abandoned (it could be after twenty-five years
under Art. 1, paragraph 2 (a)), but a wreck is not covered by the
ILA Draft until it has been submerged for at least 100 years. This
could result in circumstances in which a finder/salvor of such a
86. Id. art. 2, para. 2, reprinted in O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 407.
87. Id. cmt. 2, reprinted in O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 407.
88. I have previously advocated this position. See Steininetz v. United States, 973 F.2d
212 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993). I believe the "custom" that sovereigns
never abandon their vessels is actually of very recent origin. The United States has admitted
that until quite recently it was generally acknowledged that nations could be divested of title
to their sunken warships under the admiralty law of finds. See 1980 DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 999, 1003-05 (M.N. Leich ed.) (Opinion of State
Dep't Legal Advisor, Dec. 30, 1980) (collecting authorities). Prior to the 1960s, the decisions of
courts in this country clearly evinced the position that a State could abandon title in its
sunken warships. See, e.g., Baltimore, Crisfield & Onancock Line, Inc. v. United States, 140
F.2d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 1944) (U.S. battleship sunk as target practice in 1911); State ex rel.
Bruton v. Flying "W" Enters., Inc., 160 S.E.2d 482 (N.C. 1968) (Confederate blockade runners
and other vessels); State by Ervin v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1956), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 881 (1957) (U.S. battleship sunk as target practice in 1922, found in 1952);
Deklyn v. Davis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 154 (N.Y. 1824) (British frigate sunk in 1781 or 1782, found 30
years later).
89. See Report of the Meeting of Experts, supra note 48, at 5-7, T 22-26 (confirming the
need to exclude warships from the provisions of any draft convention).
90. ILA Draft, art. 2, reprinted in OYeefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 407. See also
Report of the Meeting of Experts, supra note 48, at 4-5, $ 16-18.
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wreck would gain title to the item due to the true owner's legal
inability to maintain title after the fifty-year period has lapsed.
Second, the caveat allowing a State Party to the ILA Draft to
alter the requirements and, in effect, to apply the Convention to
"underwater cultural heritage" that has been submerged for less
than 100 years (presumably a State could do away with this
provision entirely) could lead to inconsistent application of the
Convention and conflicts with owners' rights over their property.
The intent of Article 2 is simply unclear. By countenancing a
patch-work of national regulations, the goal of uniformity sought
by the Draft Convention will certainly be destroyed.
3. The Cultural Heritage Zone
As defined in Article 1, paragraph 3, the "'cultural heritage
zone' means all the area beyond the territorial sea of the State up
to the outer limit of its continental shelf as defined in accordance
with relevant rules and principles of international law."9 Article 5
outlines the establishment of the "cultural heritage zone" in which
"the State Party shall have jurisdiction over activities affecting the
underwater cultural heritage."'
The participants at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference (UNCLOS III) will immediately realize that such a
novel maritime zone is not in accordance with the relevant rules
and principles of international law. This expansion of coastal State
jurisdiction is certainly beyond the scope of the EEZ and
Continental Shelf regimes. The provisions establishing the
"cultural heritage zone" seek to alter those compromises reached in
Article 303 of the 1982 UNCLOS.
While some states at UNCLOS III lobbied for complete coastal
State control and authority over archaeological and historical
objects found on their continental shelves, the United States and
other nations resisted this proposal on account of a fear of
upsetting the already delicate balance of interests in the
continental shelf. The compromise allows coastal States to
completely regulate the removal of "underwater cultural heritage"
in their territorial seas and contiguous zones.
91. ILA Draft, art. 1, para. 3, reprinted in OYeefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 405.
92. Id. art. 5, para. 1, reprinted in O'Keefe & Naffiger, supra note 41, at 409; see also
STRATI, supra note 52, at 359.
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The ILA Draft, then, seeks to modify the 1982 UNCLOS in a
few material respects. It allows the creation of a "cultural heritage
zone" that is coextensive with the entire breadth of coastal State
authority out to 200 nautical miles (or beyond). However, within
that zone, the coastal State must observe the international
guidelines for the proper removal and recovery of archaeological
and historical objects as outlined in the "Charter for the Protection
and Management of the Underwater Cultural Heritage" prepared
by the International Council for Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS
Charter).93 Although the ILA Draft expands jurisdiction in some
ways, the coastal States will, in essence, be abdicating any right of
unilateral control over the cultural resources of the sea bed.
A further ambiguity remains. UNCLOS Article 303(2)
explicitly grants coastal State control over cultural property found
in the contiguous zone. Will this be altered by the ILA Draft? It
seems likely, as the "cultural heritage zone" is defined as "all the
area beyond the territorial sea of the state."94 UNCLOS Article
303(4) references future agreements on this point, but the possible
withdrawal of competence from the coastal State needs to be made
clear. Coastal nations may be unwilling to trade unilateral
authority over cultural property in the contiguous zone for a right
to enforce international recovery guidelines out to 200 nautical
miles. This implicates the issue of the actual allocation of title to
the historic wrecks and monuments under the ILA Draft, an issue
studiously avoided by UNCLOS Article 303.
4. Retroactivity and Extraterritorial Application
Articles 4, 7, 8, 10 and 11 pose genuine retroactivity problems
insofar as they will require States Party to the ILA Draft to
regulate wrecks that were previously excavated, or in the process of
excavation, prior to the ratification of the treaty. This will
adversely affect the interests of those involved in the excavation of
such wrecks, as well as those recreational divers who simply want
access to them.
93. See ILA Draft, art. 5, para. 2, reprinted in O~eefe & Naffiger, supra note 40, at 409.
See also ICOMOS Charter for the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (Oct. 9,
1995) [hereinafter ICOMOS Charter] construed in Ricardo J. Elia, ICOMOS Adopts
Archaeological Heritage Charter: Text and Commentary, J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY, Spring
1993, at 97.
94. ILA Draft, art. 1, para. 3, reprinted in O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 405.
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Article 4 provides that the law of salvage is inapplicable to
"underwater cultural heritage" covered by the ILA Draft. As
Article 303(3) of UNCLOS did not purport to modify the application
of the law of salvage with regard to cultural heritage, the ILA Draft
provision in Article 4 changes accepted international law and, as
such, poses retroactivity problems for the enforcement of the treaty
since salvors carrying on activity before its effective date could be
left without an avenue for compensation after the treaty comes into
force.
Article 7 requires that a State Party to the ILA Draft prohibit
the use of its territory or "any other areas over which it exercises
jurisdiction.., in support of any activity" 5 which will affect
"underwater cultural heritage" in violation of the Charter even if
that activity takes place outside of the State's jurisdiction as long
as that activity does not occur within the "cultural heritage zone"
or territorial sea of another State Party. Article 8 imposes a duty
on parties to prohibit their nationals and ships from activities
which affect underwater cultural heritage in violation of the
ICOMOS Charter with the same proviso at issue in Article 7.V '
These articles raise two distinct problems. First, the
retroactive application of Articles 7 and 8 could create quite a
widespread concern within the commercial and recreational diving
communities. In enforcing these articles, the State Party would
have to restrict or even terminate access to certain wrecks that
qualify for coverage under the ILA Draft despite the fact that the
wrecks had been previously excavated, if such excavation does not
conform to the requirements of the ICOMOS Charter. Further, the
State Party would be called on to prohibit its nationals and ships
from undertaking activities in violation of the Charter in areas
beyond the jurisdiction of the State as long as the activity does not
occur within the "cultural heritage zone" or territorial sea of
another State Party.
Second, since the provisions calling for extraterritorial
application of these articles only preclude applicability when the
activity occurs within the territorial sea or "cultural heritage zone"
of another State Party, it is unclear whether a State Party is
obligated to prohibit the use of its territory in support of activity
95. Id. art. 7, reprinted in O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 410.
96. For more on this provision, see STRATI, supra note 52, at 359.
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within the territorial sea or other jurisdiction of a non-party State
or whether the State Party is obligated to prohibit its nationals and
ships from such activity in territory under the control of non-party
States. Certainly, this oversight will need clarification.
Article 10 allows a State Party to seize "underwater cultural
heritage" which has been brought into the State's territory directly
or indirectly "after having been excavated or retrieved in a manner
not conforming with the Charter." 7 Article 11 calls for the
imposition of penal sanctions upon those who import "underwater
cultural heritage" into the State's territory in similar violation.
These provisions must fall prey to problems of retroactive
application. Individuals will be subject to the loss of salvaged
property that may have been retrieved at great cost. States
applying such provisions retroactively may be subject to charges of
expropriation of property.
But of even greater concern is the possibility of subjecting
salvors to arrest for activity that occurred prior to the ILA Draft's
effective date, and which did not violate any law. Such retroactivity
may, depending on the penal sanctions imposed, raise ex post facto
issues and be deemed unconstitutional under American law or in
violation of essential international human rights principles
enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.98
A clause must be added to Articles 4, 7, 8, 10, and 11 stating
that the applicability of these provisions is reserved for underwater
cultural heritage excavated after the ILA Draft enters into force in
order to rectify the problems created by retroactivity.
5. The Bar on Commercial Salvage of Historic Shipwrecks
The ideology underlying the ILA Draft was best explained in
the 1995 ICOMOS Charter,99 and incorporated by reference into
the ILA Draft. °°  The Charter provides categorically that
97. See ILA Draft, art. 10, para. 1, reprinted in O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at
411.
98. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15, para. 1,
6 I.L.M. 368, 373 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) ("No one shall be held guilty of any
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence,
under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.").
99. See ICOMOS Charter, supra note 93.
100. Interestingly, Article 15 of the ILA Draft allows that revisions in the Charter by
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"[u]nderwater cultural heritage is not to be traded as items of
commercial value."10' Moreover, "[p]roject funding must not require
the sale of underwater cultural heritage ...""'
In short, the entire purpose of the ICOMOS Charter and the
ILA Draft is to bar the commercial exploitation of historic
shipwrecks. Article 4 of the ILA Draft flatly directs that
"[u]nderwater cultural heritage shall not be subject to the law of
salvage." 3 The stated rationale for this provision is that historic
shipwrecks are not in "marine peril," an assumption challenged
above. 0 4  But, more honestly, the ILA Draft makes express its
assumptions about historic salvage. "The major problem," the ILA
commentary notes, "is that salvage is motivated by economic
considerations; the salvor is often seeking items of value as fast as
possible rather than undertaking the painstaking excavation and
treatment of all aspects of the site that is necessary to preserve its
historic value."0" Even more breath-taking is the ILA Draft's ad
hominem attack on the entire historic salvage community, as
"looters" and "destroyers of our past.""6
This disparagement and exclusion of salvage law for historic
shipwrecks is in defiance of the traditional maritime law, which
was intended to promote the responsible return of property lost at
sea to the stream of commerce. The ILA Draft and ICOMOS
Charter are, simply and categorically, anti-commerce and
inalterably opposed to the role of free-enterprise in the recovery of
property lost at sea.
It is also clear that the major thrust of the ILA Draft was to re-
write the provisions of Article 303 of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention, by (1) extending coastal State jurisdiction to 200
ICOMOS will be deemed revisions to the annexed Charter, binding on all States Party except
for those which notify their non-acceptance to the Director-General of UNESCO within six
months after the effective date of the revision. The States Parties to the ILA Draft, therefore,
do not seem to have any control over the provisions of the Charter (or revisions thereto) and
the Charter will be the controlling instrument in regard to Ikhe obligations created by the ILA
Draft. See ILA Draft, art. 15, reprinted in OKeefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 415. See also
Report of the Meeting of Experts, supra note 48, at 14-16, 57-66 (considering whether
ICOMOS Charter could be incorporated into UNESCO proposal).
101. ICOMOS Charter, supra note 93, at 4 (Curation, 2).
102. Id. at 3 (Funding, 2).
103. ILA Draft, art. 4, reprinted in O Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 408.
104. See supra text accompanying note 15; see also Feasibility Study, supra note 2, at 6,
IT 29-30 (questioning whether shipwrecks are in marine peril).
105. H1A Draft, cmt. to art. 4, reprinted in O'Keefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 409.
106. Id. cmt. to art. 14, reprinted in O'Kefe & Nafziger, supra note 40, at 414.
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nautical miles; (2) establishing a complex system of coastal State
regulatory control over historic shipwreck recovery; and (3)
abrogating the traditional maritime law of salvage and finds for
historic shipwrecks.
The desire to protect our underwater cultural heritage, while
praiseworthy, is not served by the ILA Draft as it stands. This ILA
Draft will result in a potentially dramatic increase in the already
high cost of underwater excavation. And because little or none of
the excavation done presently is government-sponsored or
financed, it is hard to believe that preservation of the underwater
cultural heritage is likely to be an outcome of this ILA Draft
coming into force. Rather, the more difficult it is for divers to
obtain access to and to excavate wrecks, the more unlikely the
goals of education and preservation will be attained and the more
probable the underwater cultural heritage will remain unseen and
unstudied.
The governments of the United States and the United
Kingdom have gone on official record with their opposition to the
ILA Draft Convention and its premises, which "were expressly
considered and rejected at the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea." °7 Other commentators have called the ILA
Draft "excessive in its depiction of coastal state rights" and "anemic
in its elaboration of coastal state duties.""8 Another writer regards
the ILA Draft as "an ambitious attempt to deal with the complex
problems posed in the protection of underwater cultural
property....""'
E. Pending Action by UNESCO
The ILA Draft was submitted for the consideration of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
107. See J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO
EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 477 (2d ed. 1996) (both authors are attorneys with the State
Department, and the volume originally appeared as a publication of the Naval War College's
International Law Studies #66). See also Caroline M. Zander & Ole Varmer, Closing the
Gaps in Domestic and International Law: Achieving Comprehensive Protection of Submerged
Resources, COMMON GROUND, Fall/Winter 1996, at 60, 68.
108. Bernard H. Oxman, Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 399, 407 n.28 (1997). See also Report of the Meeting of
Experts, supra note 48, at 13-14, 11 53-56 (considering the suitability of the ILA Draft as a
basis for a UNESCO Convention).
109. STRATI, supra note 52, at 361.
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(UNESCO) in 1995. In a Report issued on March 23, 1995,
UNESCO's Executive Board considered the feasibility of "drafting
a new instrument for the protection of the underwater cultural
heritage."' The Feasibility Study concluded that Article 303 of
UNCLOS was, "according to archaeologists and lawyers concerned
with the preservation of the underwater cultural heritage,...
insufficient for the protection of the cultural heritage.""' The
explicit reservation in Article 303(3) for the admiralty law
governing salvage and finds was characterized by UNESCO as a
"serious problem."
UNESCO has gone on record as being implacably hostile to the
interests of private salvors. One recent official UNESCO document
criticized the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention's reservation of
rights under "the law of salvage or other rules of admiralty"13 as
"protect[ing] the commercial exploitation of historic shipwrecks,
leading to the destruction of archaeological resources without their
scientific examination.""4  A Group of Experts assembled by
UNESCO to consider the contours of a Draft Convention
categorically concluded that "the recovery of archaeological
material should not be governed by its commercial value."1 ' One
expert at the meeting said that "the concept of being financially
rewarded was fundamentally antithetical to archaeological and
scientific research."" 6  The experts ultimately agreed that
"incentives to salve should not be included in the new international
provisions on the protection of underwater cultural heritage. " '
UNESCO has thus committed itself to the same anti-competitive,
state regulatory approach embraced by the ILA Draft, as well as
largely endorsing the expansion of coastal State jurisdiction
offshore. As just one example, a recent UNESCO publication
characterizes historic salvors as
110. See Feasibility Study, supra note 2, at 8-9.
111. Id. at 3, fI 14.
112. Id. at 3, % 15. But cf Report of the Meeting of Experts, supra note 48, at 7-10, 1% 27-
39 (concluding, in 39, that "it would be realistic for a future Convention to avoid referring to
any new zone under coastal State jurisdiction.... It was generally agreed to speak rather of
rights and duties of States beyond the territorial waters and ofjurisdiction implying potential
control but not control itself.").
113. UNCLOS, supra note 24, art. 303, para. 3,21 I.L.M. at 1326.
114. Feasibility Study, supra note 2, at 3, 1 17.
115. Report of the Meeting of Experts, supra note 48, at 11, 45.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 13, 1 52.
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pillage[rs], [who] are profiting from a less than watertight
legal situation [as] they remove valuable artifacts and destroy
evidence essential for the archaeologist to uncover history....
UNESCO has been called-upon by the archaeological and legal
communities along with numerous Member States to help
rectify this situation by preparing an international convention
for the protection of this vast underwater treasure trove.1 "
As of this writing, further action is pending by UNESCO.
Authorization to proceed on this drafting project was granted at
the 1997 UNESCO General Conference. The stated objective was
to have a draft convention submitted to the next General
Conference of UNESCO in November 1999.9
Other organs of the United Nations have actively participated
in the process of gutting Article 303 of the 1982 UNCLOS. In its
1996 Annual Report on the Law of the Sea,"' the United Nations
Secretariat seemed to concur that there was a need for a new
international treaty, along the lines propounded by the ILA.
121
Moreover, the United Nations Secretary General observed that
"there was general agreement that the incentives regarding
commercial value, contained in some national salvage law, should
not be included in the future international instrument.", 2   So it
appears that the United Nations has already reached the
conclusion that any new regime for underwater cultural heritage
should preclude private recovery of artifacts from shipwrecks.
23
118. Sue Williams, Underwater Heritage, A Treasure Trove to Protect, 87 UNESCO
SOURCES 7 (Feb. 1997) (No. 87).
119. UNESCO Doc. 29 C/83, at 15, 18(c) (Nov. 12, 1997).
120. Law of the Sea Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/51/645 (Nov. 1 1996)
[hereinafter Law of the Sea Report].
121. Id. at 39-40, 142-44. The International Law Commission (ILC), the organ of the
United Nations charged with the codification and progressive development of international
law, has also expressed an interest in beginning research and drafting on a Treaty concerning
shipwrecks. See U.N. Doc A/CN.4/454, at 9-16 (Nov. 9, 1993). To date, no action has been
taken on this initiative. Moreover, on June 24, 1995, the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) adopted a Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects. See International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT):
Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft UNIDROIT Convention
on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, opened for
signature June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322. This treaty may not bear on underwater cultural
heritage from shipwrecks located beyond a coastal State's territorial sea, since it is limited to
objects "removed from the territory of a Contracting State contrary to its law regulating the
export of cultural objects...." Id. art. 1(b), 34 l.L.M. at 1331 (emphasis added).
122. Law of the Sea Report, supra note 120, at 40, 143.
123. Cf. E.D. Brown, Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Draft Principles
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V. A SALVAGE SOLUTION?
I am deeply troubled that this concerted effort by a handful of
coastal States, the United Nations, and UNESCO could alter the
1982 UNCLOS provisions on salvage of historic shipwrecks. Each
of these proposals proceeds from the assumption that Article 303 of
the Convention should be revised to allow coastal state jurisdiction
over shipwrecks located beyond twenty-four miles from shore and
to otherwise restrict commercial salvage efforts.
These initiatives appear also to conflict with established U.S.
policy for the law of the sea by (1) increasing coastal State control
over activities that are traditionally high seas freedoms, and (2) by
promoting foreign government regulation of economic activities by
U.S. citizens. U.S. firms are among the leaders in historic salvage
efforts, and this sector of the maritime industry has seen
extraordinary financial investment, technological development,
and operational success. These efforts to create a new,
international regime for "underwater cultural heritage"
management would thwart U.S. businesses working in this area.
The nautical archaeological community has, moreover,
concluded that any commercial motive in recovering historic
shipwrecks is antithetical to the protection and preservation of the
underwater cultural heritage. The irony here is that most
reputable historic salvors very much desire to collaborate with
nautical archaeologists. Conducting high quality archaeological
research and observing even the most stringent protocols for the
recovery of artifacts are in the best interests of historic salvors. It
is a material element in their entitlement, under the maritime law,
to conduct recovery operations. Also, fully understanding the
provenance of recovered artifacts increases their value. In short,
embracing the values of historic preservation is good for business.
But it is not just that, of course. Most historic salvors believe
that what they do expands human knowledge about the sunken
past. Many salvors observe in situ site exploration and research
techniques, recovering only those items which, while being
materially valuable, do not add to the archaeological record. While
and Guidelines for Implementation of Article 303 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the
Sea (1982) (manuscript on file with author) (suggesting that a Resolution adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly would be the best way to proceed and that such a resolution should not
feature a cultural heritage zone nor should otherwise affect "the rights of identifiable owners,
the laws of salvage or other rules of admiralty").
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the first few gold bars or silver coins recovered from a wreck might
yield important provenance data, it would be extravagant to
suggest no item of value recovered from a wreck should be sold.
Most salvors would, of course, prefer to maintain the cohesion and
integrity of collections of artifacts recovered from shipwrecks,
consistent with the necessity to recover their investment.
Certainly with objects of unique historical or cultural value, these
are routinely donated to museums or other collections.
Is compromise possible here? Is there any role to be played by
salvage law in the recovery of historic shipwrecks? I believe there
is hope, and I have argued here that the maritime law is sensitive
to the concerns of historic preservation and archaeological
research. The admiralty law of salvage has evolved to the point
where historical preservation and commercial recovery can both be
accommodated."' The maritime law of shipwrecks is not, therefore,
an all or nothing proposition, a morality play of earnest
archaeologists waged against greedy, despoiling salvors.
Commercial interests can help nautical archaeologists get funding,
technology, and access to wrecks hitherto unimaginable. So, let us
remember that before we go ahead and commit the "ancient"
salvage law to the deep.
The solution lies, I think, in properly marrying commercial
incentives to invest vast amounts of money, time, and technology in
the search for and recovery of the sunken past, with a commitment
to quality nautical archaeology. I ultimately believe that admiralty
tribunals, applying the now-evolved laws of salvage and finds, can
achieve this balance. Moreover, I think that such an approach is
vastly superior to a system of coastal State ownership or control
over underwater cultural resources, a scheme that will simply
frustrate efforts to locate, recover, conserve, and protect that
heritage.
124. See also Geoffrey Brice, Salvage and the Underwater Cultural Heritage, MARINE
POLY, July 1996, at 337, 342.
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